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Tax Credits for Employment rather than Investment: A Comment
In a recent article in the American Economic Review,
Jonathan R. Kesselman, Samuel H. Williamson and Ernst R. Berndt
presented a Table showing the effect of substituting a marginal
employment tax credit (METC) for the investment tax credit (ITC)
over the 1962 to 1971 period. Their METC was defined in terms of
a rate times the increase in the wage bi11 over the following
base:
(1) Zt = μ (PB,t-1Bt-1 + Pw,t-1 Wt-1) μ>0
where B is blue collar employment, W is white collar employment,
and PB and PW are the wage rates for blue collar and white
collar workers respectively.
Any base, including a wage bill base, is of course merely a
proxy for what employment might be in the absence of a credit.
However, needless to say, some bases are better than others. In
this comment, I will argue that (1) is an inappropriate way to
define a base for a permanent METC that is directed at
encouraging the long-run substitution of labour for capital. A
better definition for a wage bill base would be:
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(2) Zt = :(1+g)t(PB,0B0 - + Pw,0 W0)    :>0  
where g is the assumed growth rate of the wage bill without the
credit, and the 0 subscript refers to the period before the
implementation of the credit.1  After completing my argument
concerning this point, I will go on to make a few observations on
the relevance of this analysis for the 1977 U.S. Job Credit which
has a base as defined in (1), but which is an explicitly
temporary measure and will only be in effect in 1977 and 1978.
I   The Appropriate Base for a Permanent METC
It is easiest to show that (1) is inappropriate if three
simplifying assumptions are made.  First, :  is set equal to 1
in both (1) and (2) which means for (1) that the total wage bill
in the previous year is used as a base, or for (2) that the total
wage bill in the year before the METC is implemented is used as
the base. Second, it is assumed that there will be no growth in
employment except that stimulated by the credit, thus g in (2)
can be set equal to 0.  Third, it is assumed that with or without
the credit wage rates will remain constant.
Having made these three assumptions (1) can be written:
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(3) Zt = PB,t-1Bt-1 - + Pw,t-1 Wt-1
and (2) can be written:
(4) Zt = PBB0 + Pw W0.
Suppose that in the first year of the METC the employer
is induced to increase his employment to B1  and W1 .   Then under
both base definitions (3) and (4) he would qualify for a credit
of
(5) C1 =C’1=c(PB (B1-B0) + Pw (W1-W0))
where C1 and C’1 are the total value of the credit under base
definitions (3) and (4) respectively, and c is the rate of the
credit. However, in the second year the credits would differ
under the two base definitions. Under (3) the employer would
receive:
(6) C2 = c(PB (B2-B1) + Pw (W2-W1))
and under (4) the employer would get
(7) C’2=c(PB (B2-B0) + Pw (W2-W0))
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The second assumption made above implies that (B2-B1) and
(W2-W1)  are both equal to zero.  Thus, C2 is also equal to zero. 
In contrast (B2-B0) and (W2-W0)  are equal to (B2-B1) and (W2-W1) 
respectively, so C’2 is equal to C’1.   In the third and all
subsequent periods the same result is obtained, i.e. Cn  is equal
to zero and C’n  is equal to C’1
The implication of this is very clear.  It would not be
rational for an employer to increase-employment-in order to
benefit from a permanently lower relative cost of labour if the
METC was defined using the base formula (3) which corresponds to
the formula (1) utilized by Kesselman et al. in their article. 
If an employer were to substitute labour for capital in the first
year in order to benefit from the credit, he would only have to
reverse the substitution in the second year when the lower
relative price of labour, which justified the use of more labour
intensive techniques, reverted back to its level before the METC. 
No rational employer would respond to such an incentive because
of the costs associated with changing the capital labour mix.  On
the other hand, if the METC were defined using formula (4), which
corresponds to formula (2) above, it would be rational for an
employer to substitute labour for capital because the credit
would permanently lower the relative cost of labour, and he
would be able to permanently raise his labour-capital ratio.
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The argument that a METC with a base as defined in (1)
will not induce the long-run substitution of labour for capital,
only holds if : is greater than or equal to 1.  As : approaches
0, the METC with a base defined as in (1) becomes closer and
closer to a non-marginal employment tax credit with the credit
paid on total employment.  To the extent that : is between 1 and
0, the METC would stimulate some long-run substitution of labour
for capital.  The feature of (1) that makes it an inappropriate
way to define the base is that the base moves up with induced em-
ployment, and reduces the value of the incentive in subsequent
periods.  For instance, if : is set equal to 1/2 and the other
two assumptions concerning no employment growth without the
credit and constant wage rates are made, the credit would only be
paid on 1/2 of induced employment after the first period.  In
general, the credit would be paid on l-: of the induced
employment.  This reduces the amount of long-run substitution of
labour for capital relative to what it would be with a METC
having a base as defined in (2).
The second and third simplifying assumptions made above
can also be relaxed without effecting the validity of the
conclusion that a METC with a base as defined in (2) is better
than one with a base as defined in (1).
It is important to note Chat the choice of : and g in
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formula (2) determines who can benefit from the credit.  The
higher that : and g are the fewer are the number of employers
who would be in a position to take advantage of the METC.  The
employers who would be induced to hire additional workers would
be those who expected their wage bill to be above the base. 
Those who expected their wage bill to be below the base would
have no incentive to take on additional workers.
As the value chosen for : approaches and surpasses 1,
there is an important distinction that must be kept in mind in
order to accurately assess the costs of any METC scheme.  The
distinction is that in the aggregate the METC is paid on the
gross difference between the wage bill and the base, not the net. 
The aggregate gross difference is the sum of the differences
between the wage bill and the base for all employers with wage
bills greater than the base; whereas the aggregate net difference
is the sum of the differences for all employers, including those
whose wage bills have fallen below the base.  With : equal to a
maximum of . 9 as in the Kesselman et al. article this
distinction is not so important because relatively few employers
have their wage bills shrink by more than 10 per cent in any
given year.
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II  The Job Credit
The Tax Reduction and Simplification Act, which became
Public Law 95-30 following approval by the President on May 23,
1977, contains a new Job Credit.  The credit was initiated by the
Congress as a replacement for the Administration proposal giving
businesses a choice between either a 2 percentage point increase
in the present 10 per cent investment credit, or a refundable
credit against income taxes equal to 4 per cent of social
security payroll taxes and 2 per cent of railroad retirement and
self-employment taxes.
For a taxable year beginning in 1977, the credit is equal
to 50 per cent of the excess of the aggregate unemployment
insurance wages paid during 1977 over 102 per cent of the
aggregate unemployment insurance wages paid during 1976.  For a
taxable year beginning in 1978, the credit is equal to 50 per
cent of the excess of the aggregate unemployment insurance wages
paid during 1978 over 102 per cent of the aggregate unemployment
insurance wages during 1977.  Since the unemployment insurance
wage per worker is $4,200, the 50 per cent credit is worth $2.100
per job.  The Job Credit is. thus, defined as in (1) with :
equal to 1.02 and PB  and PW  equal to $4,200.
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Before moving on to consider how the Job Credit might
work, it is worth noting that there are some restrictions on the
credit which reduce its coverage.  First, 102 per cent of the
amount of the aggregate unemployment insurance wages paid during
the preceding calendar year shall be deemed to be not less than
50 per cent of the amount of current wages.  This restriction
reduces the value of the credit to new or rapidly expanding
employers.  Second, the amount of the credit shall not exceed 50
per cent of the difference between the aggregate wages paid in a
given year and 105 per cent of the preceding year's wages.  This
restriction lessens the incentive to substitute lower paid
part-time for full-time labour.  Third, the credit with respect
to any calendar year shall not exceed $100,000, except in the
case of the additional 10 per cent credit for vocational
rehabilitation referrals.  This last restriction is the most
severe. It caps the eligible increased employment at 47 per
employer.  In effect, it transforms the Job Credit from a general
incentive to one directed at small to medium sized business.  For
large business, the credit is infra-marginal and should not
effect decision making at the margin.
Since the Job Credit is temporary and marginal with a base
as defined by formula (1), it will probably not lead to more
output through lower prices or to much long-run substitution of
labour for capital.  By long-run substitution, I mean the type of
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substitution that occurs when a business purchases new capital
equipment that can be used in combination with more labour than
can the existing capital equipment. However, the credit could
perhaps stimulate some short-run substitution of labour for
capital and other factors of production. With the credit it may
pay to use existing capital equipment more intensively, rather
than to add new equipment.  Old machines may be made to last
longer by servicing them more frequently.  It may also be
possible to economize on the use of energy and materials in the
short-run by using more labour.  Finally, the credit could
perhaps cause the postponement of the adoption of more capital
intensive techniques.
An important effect of the Job Credit that has tended to be
overlooked is that, since it is temporary, it would encourage the
intertemporal substitution of labour.  Employment could be
brought forward in time to take advantage of the credit.  Since
many employers have excess productive capacity, they do not need
to invest to acquire the capital stock necessary to use
additional workers productively. All they need is the incentive. 
The credit would provide that incentive.  It would encourage them
to employ more workers to produce for inventory while production
costs are lower due to the credit.  When demand picks up the
existence of larger stocks will serve the useful purpose of
preventing shortages from developing and keeping prices from
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rising as much as they ordinarily would.  Furthermore, the credit
could be expected to stimulate construction.  The price tag of
construction projects is usually the result of bilateral
negotiations or competitive tendering.  Many contractors can be
expected to attempt to drum up business by sharing the credit
with their customers.  In addition, employers might be induced to
bring forward some large maintenance projects that need only be
performed every few years, or they might enlarge their training
programs while they can get the government to pick up part of the
tab.
It is through the short-run substitution of labour for
capital, the postponement of the adoption of more capital
intensive techniques, and the intertemporal substitution of
labour that the Job Credit will increase employment.  Although
the effect of the credit on employment is impossible to quantify
before the fact, it could turn out to be quite large.  It must be
emphasized, however, that it is not through the traditional
neoclassical mechanism of long-run substitution of labour for
capital that the Job Credit will increase employment.
Unfortunately, the neoclassical model, as it now stands, tells us
very little about what to expect from temporary fiscal policy




* Canadian Department of Finance.  The views expressed herein
are my own, and no responsibility for them should be attributed
to the Department of Finance.  I am indebted to John Sargent,
Chris Georgas, and John Lester with whom I have discussed the
subject matter of this comment.
1.   If it is desired to extend the credit only for increases in
employment and not for increases in wage rates, then PB,0 and PW,0
in (2) should be replaced by PB,t and PW,t  I have not done this
here because I want to use a credit with a wage bill base like
Kesselman et al. for purposes of comparison.
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